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IRAN is no longer fighting a war of reciprocal strikes.

The era of tit-for-tat missile exchanges and sporadic retaliatory gestures has given way to something more deliberate and patient.

What appears to some observers as Iranian restraint or hesitation is, on closer examination, a calculated shift.

Tehran has moved beyond symbolic responses and is pursuing two interlocking objectives: the progressive elimination of American military presence and influence in the Persian Gulf, and the political destruction of the Trump presidency through economic and strategic pressure timed to the American electoral calendar.

This approach reflects a more sophisticated reading of the political and military landscape than the mere kinetic exchanges of the earlier phases.

Iran has registered the pattern of American targeting decisions that have largely spared its most critical military assets.

In contrast, the visible strain on U.S. naval forces, the thinning of American ground presence at key Gulf bases, and the growing constraints on munitions stockpiles are wearing down US military strength.

Pentagon planners appear to lack a coherent theory of victory that does not risk broader escalation.

In such conditions, Iran has concluded that the wisest course is to allow the adversary’s own errors and logistical limits to compound rather than to force a decisive confrontation that might rally American resolve.

The first prong of the strategy is therefore continually working on the steady erosion of US power projection in the region.

Iranian-aligned forces continue to pressure remaining American positions and logistical nodes while Tehran works to neutralise residual anti-Iranian networks inside Iraq.

Gulf Arab states, watching the vulnerability of host-nation bases that shelter US forces, are already exploring tighter regional defence arrangements. The presence of American troops and aircraft is increasingly perceived by some of these governments as a liability rather than a guarantee of security.

Iran does not need to seize every base by force; it needs only to make the cost of hosting them politically untenable.

Any future American strikes would now have to originate from greater distances, complicating logistics and extending response times.

In this environment, Iran can continue to consolidate influence across the northern Gulf without inviting the kind of overwhelming retaliation that might reverse its gains.

The second prong is political and economic, aimed squarely at the domestic American political arena, US President Trump’s support base.

Recent polling consistently ranks the maintenance of low oil prices among the highest foreign-policy priorities for US voters.

Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, combined with ongoing disruptions affecting Saudi and other shipments through the Red Sea, gives Tehran the ability to keep energy markets unsettled.

Iran does not require a full closure of the strait to produce sustained upward pressure on prices.

Only the credible threat of disruption and the intermittent interference already achieved are sufficient to keep markets nervous and prices elevated.

These pressures feed directly into the midterm election environment in November.

A president already facing questions about the wisdom and cost of confrontation with Iran risks further erosion of congressional support if gasoline and energy costs remain high.

By maintaining a relatively low kinetic profile against Israel despite the substantial American military buildup on and around Israeli territory, and despite Iran’s theoretical capacity to inflict severe damage, Tehran is deliberately preserving political space inside the US.

Aggressive action against Israel at this juncture would likely consolidate bipartisan support for the administration and shift the domestic debate toward solidarity rather than accountability.

Iran prefers that members of Congress focus on the strategic and economic consequences of the current policy. Should Republicans lose control of one or both chambers in November, the path opens for intensified investigations, possible impeachment proceedings, and a broader political unravelling of the administration’s foreign-policy legacy.

From Tehran’s perspective, the collapse of the Trump presidency under the weight of its own Iran policy would constitute a strategic victory of greater durability than any battlefield success.

These two lines of effort reinforce each other.

Military attrition in the Gulf weakens American capacity and raises the political cost of continued presence, while economic pressure at home constrains the administration’s freedom of action and accelerates domestic political fatigue.

Iran appears content to let time and American electoral processes work in its favour rather than to seek dramatic battlefield climaxes that could reverse the current trajectory.

Victory, in this framing, is defined less by the destruction of Israeli military power in the near term and more by the removal of US forces from the Gulf and the political demise of the administration that chose confrontation.

Whether this strategy succeeds will depend on numerous factors beyond Tehran’s control.

The resilience of American logistics, the willingness of Gulf partners to reduce their dependence on U.S. security guarantees, the actual trajectory of oil prices, and the capacity of American domestic politics to absorb prolonged costs are all factors.

Yet the pattern of Iranian behaviour of measured military pressure, careful avoidance of certain high-visibility targets, and sustained economic leverage aligns closely with the two objectives outlined above.

Iran has recalibrated from reactive retaliation to a longer game of attrition and political exhaustion.

That recalibration is the most consequential development in the conflict to date. – August 20, 2026

Originally published in The Vibes

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MICROSOFT’S 2026 Work Trend Index reveals that several ASEAN nations are significantly outpacing the global average in advanced AI use at work.

Knowledge workers across the region are adopting generative AI tools more intensively than their peers worldwide, accelerating workplace transformation at a faster pace than many expected.

Vietnam leads the ASEAN grouping, followed by Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia in fourth place.

This momentum is reshaping how work gets done and creating both opportunities and pressures for industry across Southeast Asia.

The key metric is the share of “Frontier Professionals”, workers who use AI in sophisticated ways to analyse information, solve problems, evaluate outputs, think creatively, and redesign workflows, while treating AI results as a starting point rather than a final answer.

Globally, only about 16% of AI users fall into this category.

In Vietnam, the figure reaches 39%, more than double the world average.

Indonesia follows at 33%, Thailand at 32%, and Malaysia at 24%.

These levels reflect not just higher adoption but greater maturity, as large majorities of AI users in these markets report producing work that they could not have created a year earlier, often exceeding global benchmarks of around 58%.

This surge is transforming workplaces immensely.

Routine tasks are being shifted to AI agents, freeing people to focus on higher-value judgment, decision-making, and innovation.

Productivity signals from Microsoft 365 data and surveys of thousands of knowledge workers show employees generating more complex outputs and emphasising human skills such as critical thinking and quality control of AI results.

Yet a clear gap has emerged. Individual workers are often moving faster than their organisations.

Leadership alignment on AI strategy, incentives for experimentation, and redesigned processes lag in many firms.

The result is a “transformation paradox”, a strong bottom-up adoption that risks stalling without top-down structures, governance, and training.

ASEAN’s relatively young demographic profile provides a structural advantage. Younger workforces tend to adopt new technologies more readily and adapt workflows with fewer legacy constraints.

Combined with rising digital infrastructure and national AI strategies, this has fueled faster diffusion of generative AI tools compared with many older, more established economies.

The region’s ability to scale human-AI collaboration quickly positions it to capture productivity gains that could add hundreds of billions to GDP in the coming years, provided businesses and governments invest in skills, data infrastructure, and responsible use frameworks.

For the industry, the implications are clear. Companies that treat AI as a mere productivity add-on will fall behind those building “Frontier Firms, organizations that embed AI into core processes, create human-agent teams, and continuously redesign work.

Sectors such as financial services, manufacturing, logistics, and professional services stand to gain the most from higher-value output and faster decision cycles.

At the same time, the rapid pace raises demands for upskilling, ethical guidelines, and change management to avoid uneven benefits or skill polarisation.

Malaysia, ranking fourth in the ASEAN grouping with 24% Frontier Professionals, illustrates both the opportunity and the challenge.

Malaysian knowledge workers already exceed the global average and report strong gains in producing novel work, with many treating AI output responsibly as a foundation for further analysis.

Nearly one in three notes clear leadership alignment on AI, better than the global figure, yet organisational systems still trail individual enthusiasm.

This creates a window for the Malaysian industry to close the gap through targeted investments in training, incentives for experimentation, and process redesign.

With national initiatives focused on AI skills and expanding cloud infrastructure, Malaysia is well-placed to convert its solid mid-pack position into a competitive advantage, particularly in high-growth sectors.

Firms that move decisively now can help the country punch above its weight in the region’s AI-driven economic shift, turning demographic strengths and rising adoption into sustained industrial transformation. – August 7, 2026

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IN the contested waters of the South China Sea, where overlapping claims and great-power rivalry intersect, a familiar pattern is playing out once again.

Recent clashes between Chinese Coast Guard vessels and Philippine forces at Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal have underscored Beijing’s preference for calibrated, low-intensity coercion over outright naval confrontation.

These incidents involving baton strikes, water cannon barrages, and dangerous manoeuvres are coinciding with the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group’s operations in the area following its transit through the Luzon Strait.

While US officials frame the carrier’s presence as routine freedom of navigation and support for allies, the timing amplifies perceptions of strategic strain on Washington.

The George Washington carrier strike group (CSG), with its F-35 capabilities and escorts, projects power, yet it operates amid a backdrop where China’s “grey zone” tactics using coast guard, maritime militia, and civilian assets are proving remarkably effective at contesting control without crossing thresholds that might trigger full military escalation.

This flare-up arrives as the Trump administration, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has issued strong statements reaffirming commitments to the Philippines and challenging excessive maritime claims. Rubio has described Chinese actions as “disturbing” and emphasised that the US will not abandon its treaty ally.

Yet commentators note a broader context where the simultaneous pressures from the ongoing Iran conflict, as US forces remain engaged, appear to stretch decision-making bandwidth at the Pentagon.

Philippines forces taking the direct brunt.

Some observers interpret Trump’s approach, including backdowns or de-escalatory signals on Iran, alongside SCS developments, as revealing the limits of US military overstretch and prioritisation.

China’s playbook here is not new but has been refined from experience.

Rather than deploying PLAN capital ships directly against US carriers, Beijing leverages asymmetric advantages, such as swarming an area with smaller vessels, legal warfare (lawfare) narratives framing Philippine resupply as “illegal,” and incremental normalisation of presence.

These tactics erode the status quo slowly, forcing the US and allies into reactive postures.

A direct US response risks escalation optics or alienating regional neutrals, but conscious restraint invites accusations of weakness or abandonment.

This dilemma is precisely the value of grey-zone operations that China is exploiting with the hesitation of US military rules-based responses.

Whether these events are deliberate synchronisation between SCS assertiveness and Middle East tensions or opportunistic convergence, maximize the strain on US military planners.

With resources divided across theatres, the Indo-Pacific “pivot” faces practical tests.

George Washington’s deployment signals resolve, yet without a clear counter to the coast guard militia tactics, it risks underscoring asymmetry.

Philippine resilience, backed by US training and presence (including recent multilateral exercises with Japan), adds layers, but the burden of response often falls on Manila’s smaller forces.

This is an issue the leadership within ASEAN has not considered at this stage.

These actions are tipping the region beyond any strategic balance between the major players.

For the US, the challenge lies in calibrating deterrence.

Carrier strike groups uphold presence and reassure allies, but they do not easily neutralise non-kinetic coercion.

However, China’s unconventional approach demonstrates how patience and asymmetry can challenge even the world’s premier naval power.

As tensions simmer, the sea’s grey waters reflect a contest where victory may belong less to the side with the largest ships and more to the one mastering ambiguity.

This, however, is taking the region away from being an ASEAN-designated ‘zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN)’ towards another conflict region. – August 4, 2026

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IN the shifting currents of a fragmenting world order, where traditional maritime chokepoints are increasingly weaponised amid what many call a new Cold War, Russia is betting heavily on the Arctic.

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) along its northern coastline is no longer just a seasonal passage for hardy adventurers or resource hauliers.

It is being reimagined as a strategic lifeline, a Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor that promises to reroute global trade, secure energy exports, and anchor Moscow’s “pivot to the East.”

This is classic great-power adaptation: when southern routes become fraught with disruption, look north where ice is melting, and opportunities (and risks) are opening.

The need for Russia is compelling.

The NSR can slash distances between major Asian and European ports by up to 40%, saving thousands of kilometres and up to two weeks compared to the Suez Canal.

In an era of Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea, potential blockades in the Strait of Hormuz, tensions in the Strait of Malacca, and US naval presence in contested waters like the South China Sea, a route hugging the Russian Arctic coast offers a tantalising alternative.

Shipping around the Cape of Good Hope is simply too long and costly.

For a sanctioned Russia seeking to export oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and other resources to hungry Asian markets, this northern highway bypasses vulnerable southern bottlenecks.

Economic and Strategic Imperatives

Russia’s push is multifaceted. Domestically, it aligns with the urgent need to develop Siberia and the Russian Far East.

These vast territories, rich in diamonds, gold, tin, fish, nickel, copper, and hydrocarbons, represent both opportunity and vulnerability.

Low population density creates labour shortages, while harsh permafrost, extreme cold, and vast distances challenge infrastructure.

Yet the “pivot to the East” is a national priority to reorient trade toward China, India, and Southeast Asia to offset Western sanctions, stimulate special economic zones like Advanced Special Economic Zones and the Vladivostok Free Port, and extract resources that fuel the economy.

The NSR is central to this. Backed by massive investments, which include around 1.8 trillion rubles (roughly USD $20-24 billion) until 2035 for infrastructure, plus broader megaprojects like those on the Taimyr Peninsula, the route is primarily a resource export artery.

Over 80% of recent cargo has been Russian crude and LNG. Projects like Novatek’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2, alongside Rosneft’s Vostok Oil ambitions, drive much of the traffic.

Cargo volumes hit records around 37-38 million tons in 2024-2025, though far below earlier ambitious targets of 80 million by 2024.

Transit remains modest (a few million tons), dominated by Russian or Russia-China flows.

Russia’s nuclear icebreaker fleet, which is unique in the world, has plans to expand to 11 or more vessels to provide the critical escort capability.

Nuclear-powered ships like those from Project 22220 enable operations in ice-choked waters.

Partnerships with China, framed under the “Polar Silk Road,” add another layer.

Joint coordination aims for multi-season reliability by the 2030s, with Chinese shipping lines testing routes and considering container services.

South Korea has signalled interest in test voyages. Yet engagement often appears more political than purely commercial.

Challenges on Thin Ice

Reality bites really hard in the Arctic, where extreme conditions, sub-zero temperatures, shifting permafrost, polar nights, and unpredictable ice complicate construction and operations.

Despite climate change extending the navigable season (now several months, with hopes for longer), the ice remains a hazard. Most vessels still require icebreaker escorts, driving up costs.

Russia mandates permits, ice-class ships, and fees, while enforcing controls that raise sovereignty questions for international users.

Global shipping giants hesitate because of the high insurance premiums, environmental risks (including potential spills in fragile ecosystems), a lack of robust emergency infrastructure, and geopolitical tensions that deter major commitments.

Sanctions following the Ukraine conflict have slowed projects, restricted technology and financing, and complicated shipbuilding.

Ambitious targets have been repeatedly scaled back.

Bellona and other observers note that economics do not yet match the promotional rhetoric; the route remains niche, heavily domestic, and dependent on Russian hydrocarbons.

Demographic and logistical hurdles in the east persist, where expanding the Trans-Siberian Railway and Baikal-Amur Mainline is essential but capital-intensive.

Labour shortages and outmigration undermine development goals.

Moreover, heightened activity raises tensions in the Bering Strait, where retreating ice opens new lanes amid increased Russian, US, and joint Russia-China patrols.

This narrow chokepoint between Russia and Alaska symbolises emerging great-power competition in the Arctic.

The Broader Geopolitical Canvas

Russia’s NSR strategy cannot be divorced from the wider multipolar shift.

Sanctions and Western isolation have accelerated eastward reorientation, deepening ties with China as a buyer, investor, and partner.

Yet this relationship is asymmetric, as China seeks control or influence rather than allowing dependency on Russian-administered infrastructure.

Beijing hedges with multiple options, viewing the NSR as one corridor among many.

India and others show interest but move cautiously.

Russia is leveraging geography by promoting the NSR (and broader Trans-Arctic concepts linking to inland waterways).

Moscow is now positioning itself as a maritime power bridging Europe and Asia on its terms.

Climate change, often framed negatively elsewhere, is an asset here, where melting ice is a strategic gift.

Yet over-reliance on China carries long-term risks, including subtle demographic and economic encroachment in the Far East.

The Iran-related disruptions and Red Sea issues have sharpened focus on alternatives, with Russian officials highlighting the NSR’s safety and efficiency. However, true year-round viability remains distant.

Investment shortfalls, ship shortages (especially Arc7 ice-class vessels), and sanctions bite. Progress is incremental, relying more on domestic resource flows, selective Asian partnerships, and infrastructure upgrades.

Future Horizons

The NSR embodies Russia’s adaptation to isolation and ambition.

Success hinges on balancing massive infrastructure needs with fiscal realities, navigating environmental and international hesitations, and managing great-power rivalry in the Arctic.

For Russia, it secures export pathways and eastern development.

For partners like China, it offers diversification.

For the world, it signals a potential new artery in global trade, if ice, economics, and geopolitics can align in a new multi-polar world.

In a world of contested chokepoints, the route through the ice represents more than shipping lanes.

This sheds light on why US President Trump had so much interest in Greenland.

It is a statement of strategic autonomy, a hedge against southern vulnerabilities, and a high-stakes gamble on the melting north. Whether it becomes a transformative corridor or remains a specialised resource route will shape Russia’s place in the emerging order, one where Arctic mastery could define influence for decades.

The bear is moving north, and the world is watching. – July 31, 2026

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In the swirling chaos of the latest Middle Eastern escalations, Saudi Arabia appears to have crossed a Rubicon. What on the surface looks like a high-risk alignment with the United States against the so-called Axis of Resistance may, upon closer examination, reflect a kingdom that perceives itself as facing an existential threat to its economic lifeline and regime stability.

The recent Houthi attacks on Aramco facilities in Yanbu and Jizan, combined with a declared naval blockade disrupting Red Sea exports to Asia, and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, have squeezed Saudi Arabia’s oil-dependent economy in ways that strike at the heart of its Vision 2030 ambitions and royal legitimacy.

Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis claimed responsibility for missile and drone strikes on these Red Sea coastal sites, critical for bypassing the Hormuz chokepoint. Yanbu, in particular, serves as the primary western export terminal.

These actions follow the breakdown of a fragile truce and retaliatory Saudi-linked strikes, including on Houthi-held positions around Hodeidah. With roughly 5% of global oil production potentially at risk through direct hits and rerouting impossibilities, Riyadh confronts not just revenue loss but a direct challenge to the petro-rentier social contract that underpins Al Saud rule.

This pressure culminated in joint US-Saudi strikes on Iran-linked militias in eastern Iraq on July 28, 2026, targeting sites from which drones had menaced Saudi energy infrastructure. The operation followed Iranian-directed attempts on US forces, including actions linked to Jordan. For a kingdom long wary of direct confrontation, this represents a notable shift. Saudi Arabia is no longer content with proxy containment or quiet diplomacy; it is actively participating in kinetic responses.

Compounding the sense of encirclement is the recent US-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement. Signed in the last couple of weeks, this deal grants Riyadh pathways toward civilian nuclear capabilities, potentially including domestic enrichment.

While framed as energy diversification, it signals hedging against Iran’s own nuclear advances and cements strategic alignment with Washington. Yet it also risks inflaming regional grievances, positioning Saudi Arabia as hypocritical in the eyes of Tehran’s allies while accelerating a potential arms race.

Internal cohesion and external posturing add layers of complexity

Reports suggest Pakistani forces in the kingdom may be standing down, limiting one layer of conventional deterrence. Riyadh’s stance throughout the broader US-Israeli-Iranian conflict has been deliberately opaque, balancing normalization talks, OPEC+ interests, and domestic reform narratives.

The strike on Yemeni targets and joint Iraq operation now place it more firmly in the anti-Iran camp. Speculation about internal dissent with friction between branches of the sprawling Al Saud family, tribal interests, or elements acting without full buy-in from King Salman or Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) remains plausible but unconfirmed.

In Saudi Arabia’s centralized system, major military moves rarely occur without apex approval, suggesting calculated risk rather than rogue adventurism.

From a broader regional lens, Saudi actions risk deepening a bipolar Gulf dynamic, with Iran consolidating influence through proxies while Riyadh bets on US security guarantees and economic resilience. This pits long-term Saudi ambitions for Gulf primacy against Iranian resilience and asymmetric capabilities.

Israeli interests may align tactically against Iran but diverge on Palestinian issues and broader Arab-Israeli integration. US policy gains a key partner but inherits entanglement in Saudi vulnerabilities.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia’s moves suggest a leadership convinced that inaction poses a greater existential danger than escalation. The kingdom’s oil economy, social modernization project, and monarchical continuity all depend on secure export routes and deterrence credibility.

With Hormuz contested, Red Sea routes menaced, and proxies probing defenses, Riyadh calculates that aligning firepower with Washington today preserves the breathing room needed for tomorrow’s transformations. Whether this proves prescient or precipitates wider conflagration remains the region’s defining uncertainty. In a Middle East where perceptions of threat often drive reality, Saudi Arabia is acting as if its survival depends on it.

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Satellite imagery released by independent open-source intelligence group EGYOCENT indicate that that US military aircraft have all been evacuated from Al Udeid and Al Dhafra airbases in Qatar and the EAU respectively. All US equipment to service military aircraft has also been removed.

Both of the above airbases in the Gulf were instrumental on the early attacks on Iran by US forces. Iran has been (and is continuing) attacks on these bases even after the MOU was signed with the US last month.

The attacks on Al Udeid and Al Dhafra airbases has been part of larger attacks by Iran on other airbases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. THAAD and C-RAM radar and early warning systems have been targeted and disabled, as well as mission control centres, Maintenance centres, tarmac service equipment, and crew quarters during the war.

Aircraft now removed.

Iran has focused its attacks on eliminating the US ability to launch air attacks on Iran, rather than engage in indiscriminate warfare. The damage costs to the United States is reported to be in the Billions of Dollars.

Very scarce photography of damaged US radar system in the gulf.

An aerial overhead view of “Ops Town” at at Al Udeid Air Base (AB), Al Rayyan Province, Qatar (QAT), taken from a US Air Force (USAF) KC-135 Stratotanker during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

As a consequence future air attacks on Iran (where US aircraft are used as launch platforms for missiles), must now come from much further afield, which will require aircraft refueling through KC-135 stratotankers. This greatly increases the tight and long range support-systems needed to assist and US attacks. Some future air attacks on Iran may have to come from the Continental US or Europe using B-52, B1, and even B-2 bombers on long air missions.

This new information shown in the satellite imagery may indicate a reason why major attacks were not made against Iran this weekend.

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THE escalating conflict in the Gulf, now drawing in Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthi) militants in direct retaliation against Saudi Arabia, is rapidly reshaping global energy, food, and supply chains.

With oil prices surging past US$100 per barrel and threats to key maritime routes, such as the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz, the world faces potential shortages of oil, fertiliser precursors, and plastic raw materials.

Europe and Asia, which are heavily dependent on these flows, are particularly vulnerable.

For Malaysia, long accustomed to a degree of insulation through its energy resources and diversified trade, this “Gulf War” demands urgent preparation rather than the current distraction of election fever.

Houthi claims of attacks on Saudi tankers in the Red Sea have already triggered sharp price spikes, with Brent crude jumping significantly in recent sessions.

This is no isolated incident. It compounds disruptions from the broader US-Iran tensions, including attacks on infrastructure and retaliatory strikes.

The Ansar Allah (Houthis’) naval blockade against Saudi Arabia threatens an alternative route for oil flows, stoking fears of wider escalation. President Trump’s warnings of holding Iran responsible and considering massive retaliation, potentially with Israeli involvement, underscore the volatility.

Rumours of US military buildups, including B-1 bombers and medical preparations, suggest preparations for prolonged conflict.

The economic ripple effects are immediate and multifaceted.

Energy prices are climbing, pushing up government bond yields globally as investors anticipate inflation and potential Federal Reserve rate hikes.

This could dampen consumer spending, corporate profits, and stock markets.

More critically for commodity-dependent nations, the surge in energy costs is driving up agricultural futures.

Wheat, corn, and soybeans have rallied sharply, with wheat recently hitting three-year highs.

A triple threat to global supplies, disrupted shipping, higher input costs, and potential fertiliser shortages loom large.

Malaysia, despite being a net exporter of oil and gas in aggregate, remains structurally vulnerable.

The country imports significant volumes of refined petroleum products to meet domestic demand, with consumption outpacing local production.

A substantial portion of crude imports has historically transited vulnerable chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz.

Higher global prices will directly inflate fuel costs, straining the government’s subsidy regime.

Maintaining these subsidies amid rising import bills will become fiscally burdensome, potentially forcing difficult trade-offs in the national budget.

The petrochemical sector faces parallel pressures.

Malaysia’s plastics industry, a significant contributor to manufacturing and exports, relies on raw materials like naphtha, ethylene, and propylene derived from oil and gas. Disruptions in Middle Eastern supply chains, which are already evident in earlier phases of regional instability, could squeeze availability and drive up costs.

Fertiliser production and imports are similarly exposed.

Malaysia imports millions of tonnes annually to support its palm oil and agricultural sectors. Higher energy and raw material costs, combined with potential export restrictions from key suppliers, threaten food production costs at home.

With Malaysia importing up to 60% of its food, any surge in global prices will transmit quickly through logistical chains, exacerbating inflationary pressures on households.

Beyond commodities, the conflict highlights Malaysia’s exposure to geopolitical unpredictability.

US policy under Trump has introduced new variables, including tariffs on Malaysian goods and criticisms over regional stances.

The collapse of any near-term US-Iran understanding leaves little room for de-escalation, with daily exchanges between forces heightening risks to Gulf infrastructure. Iranian retaliation could target not just direct adversaries but broader shipping and energy facilities, indirectly imperilling Asian supply lines.

Domestically, Malaysia appears deceptively insulated for now.

However, this complacency is dangerous. Election cycles and political manoeuvring are diverting attention from critical economic decisions that must be made at the highest levels.

Leadership needs to move beyond short-term populism toward strategic foresight.

Key questions include: How will subsidy rationalisation be managed without sparking social unrest?

What diversification of energy and fertiliser sources is feasible in the short to medium term?

How can supply chain resilience be built for petrochemicals and food imports?

Policy responses should be multi-pronged. Accelerating investments in renewable energy and domestic refining capacity could reduce long-term vulnerability.

Strategic stockpiling of critical commodities, including fuel, fertiliser, and grains warrant immediate consideration.

Trade diplomacy to secure alternative suppliers from non-conflict zones, perhaps deepening ties within ASEAN or with Latin American and African producers, is essential.

At the same time, fiscal prudence is needed to manage rising subsidy costs without derailing development priorities.

The interconnectedness of today’s global economy means no nation is truly immune. Higher borrowing costs, if the US Fed tightens, could slow Malaysia’s growth trajectory. Reduced corporate profits in export sectors, combined with imported inflation, risk squeezing margins and employment.

The food industry, already facing higher futures prices, will pass costs to consumers, potentially reigniting debates over cost-of-living pressures.

Malaysia’s policymakers have historically demonstrated agility in navigating external shocks, from the Asian Financial Crisis to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Yet this Gulf crisis combines energy security, food security, and geopolitical realignment in a potent mix.

The window for proactive measures is narrowing as oil hovers above US$100, and tensions show no signs of abating.

The time for preparation is now, before the full effects cascade through markets, budgets, and dinner tables.

Malaysia cannot afford to be caught reacting to events shaped far beyond its shores.

A focused, whole-of-government approach, prioritising resilience over rhetoric, will determine whether the country weathers this storm or is battered by it.

The leadership must rise above immediate political distractions and confront the uncomfortable realities of interdependence in an increasingly unstable world. – July 25, 2026

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THE quote attributed to Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto after Pearl Harbour, “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve”, echoes as a cautionary tale about underestimating an adversary’s will to fight.

In the context of the ongoing Iran conflict, many observers are now asking whether US and Israeli strikes have done something analogous and transformed the Iranian leadership from a calculated, patient actor into one driven by existential urgency and hardened resolve.

The February 28, 2026, US - Israeli operation, codenamed Epic Fury by the US, fundamentally altered Iran’s internal dynamics.

The initial strikes killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several family members and top officials, alongside collateral civilian tolls, including a girls’ school near a military site that claimed around 170 lives.

This decapitation and the pattern of civilian impacts appear to have catalysed a psychological shift in the surviving Iranian elite.

Before February, Iran’s strategy under Khamenei emphasised “strategic patience,” asymmetric deterrence through proxies (the “axis of resistance”), and incremental nuclear advances while avoiding all-out confrontation.

The regime struck a balance between ideological rigidity and pragmatic survival, often pulling back from the brink.

The loss of the paramount leader, who embodied the revolution for over three decades, has removed a stabilising, albeit hardline, figure and elevated new voices less wedded to the old equilibrium.

Subsequent operations, including recent strikes near Shahid Baghaei Hospital in Ahvaz, a specialised children’s cancer facility, forced emergency evacuations of young patients, amplifying perceptions of indiscriminate aggression.

Mojtaba Khamenei, who was named the Supreme Leader in early March 2026, represents continuity in name and presumed ideology but operates in a radically different context.

Reports suggest he has remained largely in the shadows, allowing figures like Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to front negotiations.

This low profile may reflect caution amid power consolidation or a deliberate strategy to project regime resilience.

Yet the broader leadership encompassing IRGC commanders, hardline parliamentarians, and surviving clerics now show signs of a more confrontational mindset.

Mass public mobilisations, with reports of up to 40 million participating in mourning and calls for revenge in the immediate aftermath, provided the new leadership with a perceived mandate.

This underscores a narrative of national victimhood and unified defiance that leaders have leveraged.

Iranian state media and officials frame the strikes not merely as military setbacks but as existential assaults on Iranian sovereignty and Shia identity, reinforcing a siege mentality.

A key manifestation of this shift is the accelerated push toward nuclear options. Iran’s parliament has passed measures suspending or limiting cooperation with the IAEA, with some lawmakers advocating withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Pre-strike, Iran was already enriching uranium to near-weapons levels (around 60%) and had amassed significant stockpiles.

Unverified reports claim the conflict has damaged facilities and buried much material.

Yet resolve appears undiminished. Leadership rhetoric now openly links nuclear deterrence to survival against “repeated US betrayals” during negotiations.

Analysts note that the old Fatwa against nuclear weapons, attributed to Khamenei Sr., may be sidelined or reinterpreted. Rumours persist of rapid assembly capabilities or even covert possession, though verifiable evidence remains elusive.

The North Korean model, where nuclear weapons act as a shield enabling regime survival and leverage, has gained traction in Tehran discourse.

A potential demonstration test is speculated upon in some circles, though crossing that threshold risks total isolation or further escalation.

The pre-strike “MoU” framework, mediated partly by Pakistan and involving Qatar, now seems fragile as Iranian leaders view past talks as duplicitous covers for strikes.

Psychologically, this evolution mirrors trauma-induced hardening.

Decades of sanctions, assassinations of scientists, and now direct leadership decapitation and civilian targeting have eroded whatever trust remained in diplomatic off-ramps.

Where once restraint served to preserve the regime, survival now appears predicated on demonstrating that further attacks carry unbearable costs.

This is not mere bluster; Iran’s conventional responses, proxy activations in Yemen and elsewhere, threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and potential Red Sea disruptions signal a willingness to inflict global economic pain.

Statements by President Trump about future strikes on bridges and power infrastructure only reinforce this calculus. Iranian leaders calculate that tit-for-tat is obsolete, where retaliation must be decisive to deter perpetual bombardment. The axis of resistance, though degraded, remains a tool for calibrated chaos.

Closing or threatening chokepoints like Hormuz could paralyse oil flows, spike global prices, and pressure Gulf states and beyond, exactly the “devastating” response Tehran promises.

Critics argue this “terrible resolve” risks miscalculation.

A leadership convinced that compromise invites destruction may overplay its hand, provoking the very regime-change outcomes Washington once sought. Conversely, underestimating Iran’s post-strike cohesion could prove equally dangerous.

The regime has demonstrated remarkable adaptability, rallying domestic support through shared grievance even amid war fatigue and economic strain.

Public honour for the fallen supreme leader blended grief with calls for vengeance, creating a unifying mythos for the new order.

The psychological transformation is thus twofold: from patient asymmetry to urgent deterrence, and from ideological posturing to perceived existential necessity.

Iranian leaders no longer view nuclear ambiguity as sufficient; many now see a credible deterrent, whether this is demonstrated or assembled on short notice, as the only barrier to repeated humiliations.

This shift complicates mediation efforts. Diplomats from Pakistan and others shuttle proposals, but Iranian positions have stiffened, with full sanctions relief, reconstruction aid, and guarantees against future strikes now being made baseline demands.

As of mid-2026, the conflict simmers with fragile ceasefires and brinkmanship.

Trump has reiterated red lines against Iranian nuclear weapons while threatening escalated conventional strikes. Iran, for its part, signals it will not blink.

The “sleeping giant” metaphor may overstate Iran’s conventional strength, but it captures something real, a leadership that feels it has little left to lose and much to prove both to its own population and the world.

History warns that resolve born of trauma can sustain prolonged resistance, often at terrible cost to all involved.

Whether this awakens a path to negotiated stability or deeper catastrophe remains the defining question of the crisis. – July 17, 2026

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IN the sweltering waters of the Strait of Hormuz, where a fifth of the world’s oil once flowed with relative predictability, President Donald Trump’s latest grand gamble is unfolding not as a masterstroke of deal-making but as a slow-motion unravelling.

What began with bold declarations and the shredding of diplomatic remnants has devolved into a chaotic cycle of strikes, retaliations, and half-hearted ceasefires.

The so-called memorandum of understanding lies in tatters, superseded by fresh American attacks and Iran’s punishing responses.

Far from a coherent strategy, the administration’s moves increasingly bear the hallmarks of impulse over calculation.

Trump entered this fray promising strength, security, and perhaps another “beautiful” agreement.

Instead, the United States finds itself entangled in a confrontation where escalation ladders are controlled more by Tehran than by Washington.

The Iranian Supreme Leader’s funeral drew massive crowds channelling raw grief into calls for revenge.

Oil stockpiles worldwide teeter on the edge. Global powers remain fractured in their responses.

And the war in Ukraine, far from winding down, draws new momentum from the distraction.

Israeli PM B Netanyahu

In this volatile brew, further escalation isn’t bold leadership; it’s playing Russian roulette with the global economy.

The human and strategic costs are mounting. Iran views the conflict as existential, hardening its resolve to fight on multiple fronts.

Proxy battles rage: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis disrupting the Red Sea, and strikes testing Gulf states’ resilience.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others watch their own vulnerabilities exposed.

Pakistan and regional players are currently scrambling for de-escalation, recognising that uncontrolled fire could consume monarchies and republics alike.

Iran holds the escalation initiative; it has little incentive to return to the negotiating table, where prior terms were discarded.

In the United States, the clock ticks louder. Congressional elections loom in November.

A backlash could flip the House or Senate, empowering investigations, impeachment proceedings, and scrutiny not just of policy but of the Trump family’s dealings.

Trump’s term, already a second-act drama, risks premature curtailment.

Meanwhile, across the region, Benjamin Netanyahu confronts his own electoral precipice in Israel.

Defeat there could mean legal accountability without the shield of power or a timely pardon. Alliances built on mutual political survival are brittle at best.

Economically, the warning lights are flashing red.

Europe, already mired in recessionary gloom, faces energy shocks that could cascade across the Atlantic.

Shipping disruptions, insurance spikes, and oil volatility punish consumers and industries alike. Trump’s approach, heavy on military signalling, light on sustained diplomacy, has depleted U.S. arms stockpiles, strained by simultaneous demands from Ukraine and the Gulf.

The nation risks emerging militarily hollowed even if tactical wins accumulate.

Advisors, critics charge, offer short-term operational tweaks rather than the long-view statecraft needed to navigate great-power friction and proxy entanglements.

The MAGA base, drawn to promises of restraint abroad and focus at home, shows signs of disillusionment as images of endless conflict dominate feeds and fuel prices bite.

Iran’s strategists reportedly see this internal erosion as their sharpest weapon by letting Trump’s own decisions, unchecked by cooler counsel, do the heavy lifting of self-inflicted damage.

Emotional rhetoric substitutes for patient leverage. Tactical strikes replace strategic patience.

The result is a policy that looks muscular in press releases but brittle under sustained pressure.

Gulf nations under direct or indirect threat understand the stakes.

The Red Sea’s viability as a trade route hangs in the balance. Global supply chains, still scarred by prior shocks, face fresh tests.

Nations once aligned in containing Iran now hedge, divided by energy needs, ideological pulls, and fears of wider war.

Trump’s insistence on “toll-free” passage and security fees imposed on allies has mixed bravado with transactional demands that strain even friendly relations.

History rarely offers clean parallels, but the echoes are uncomfortable: great powers drawn into regional quagmires by overconfidence, underestimating adversaries’ resilience and domestic political blowback.

Trump’s team excels at short-term disruption through blockades, escorts, and targeted hits, but without a viable off-ramp or broader diplomatic architecture, it leaves the initiative with Iran.

Tehran can calibrate pain: sporadic attacks, proxy intensification, nuclear ambiguity. Washington burns resources and political capital.

The supreme irony is that a president who campaigned on ending endless wars and putting America first may find his legacy defined by a preventable spiral in one of the world’s most dangerous chokepoints.

Without a pivot toward sustained, realistic diplomacy, honouring the spirit if not the letter of prior understandings, the Gulf of Hormuz may not just test American resolve but expose the limits of one man’s instincts when pitted against geography, history, and collective global exhaustion.

As oil prices jitter and body counts rise, the question isn’t whether Trump can declare victory in a tweet.

It’s whether the domestic and international bills will come due before November, and whether the republic’s institutions can absorb yet another self-induced crisis.

The waters of Hormuz run deep, dark, and unforgiving.

Navigating them demands more than slogans. It requires strategy.

The current course suggests a different destination, not triumph, but a slow, grinding erosion of the very power Trump seeks to project. – July 15, 2026

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No country is more important to Australia than Indonesia, said the former Australian prime minister Paul Keating once. Today, that neighbour is quietly arming itself with supersonic cruise missiles capable of reaching deep into regional flashpoints. The latest catalyst? Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Jakarta, where deals were signed that prioritise things that go bang over broader human development.

President Prabowo Subianto, with his military background, proved an eager customer. Among the agreements inked was a roughly US$630 million package for BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and Astra air-to-air missiles. Developed jointly by India and Russia, the BrahMos is one of the world’s fastest operational supersonic cruise missiles, hitting speeds up to Mach 2.8, with a range of around 450 km and the ability to carry a 300 kg conventional warhead. It can be launched from land, sea, submarine, or air platforms.

For Indonesia, this acquisition adds real strategic reach. Deployed along its vast archipelago, including existing missile capabilities near the Strait of Malacca, these systems could target key points in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. From ships or aircraft, they extend concern toward northern Australia. Indonesia becomes the third Southeast Asian operator after Vietnam and the Philippines, a clear signal of an accelerating arms dynamic in ASEAN.

This is not happening in a vacuum. Prabowo’s Indonesia is in an active phase of military modernisation at a time when economic headwinds are mounting. Economist Dr Titik Anas, formerly a special advisor to the Finance Minister under Jokowi, has warned of capital outflows, a weakening rupiah, rising borrowing costs, and policy misalignment since Prabowo took office in late 2024. Investor confidence has taken a hit.

Meanwhile, the flagship free nutritious food programme (Makan Bergizi Gratis) has faced a reported 20% budget cut amid allegations of mismanagement and corruption. Each BrahMos missile carries a price tag reportedly up to US$5 million. The math is uncomfortable: resources diverted from feeding children and tackling health challenges toward hardware that feeds threat perceptions.

The “guns versus butter” trade-off is as old as economics itself. Indonesia subconsciously perceives real security concerns, not least an uneven potential rivalry with a much larger and better-armed China across the region. Yet critics quietly note that heavy spending on prestige weaponry risks amplifying vulnerabilities rather than resolving them, especially when basic services strain and economic fundamentals wobble.

Modi’s visit also included cultural gestures, such as support for the Prambanan temple complex, nodding to deep historical Hindu-Buddhist ties between India and Indonesia. These are welcome. Yet the headline outcome remains defence-heavy. Little public emphasis fell on medical technology, where India has growing strengths, innovations that could genuinely improve lives rather than prepare for their potential end.

Indonesia’s strategic caution in the past is giving way to more assertive balancing. Acquiring BrahMos strengthens its hand in protecting vital sea lanes and projecting power. But it also contributes to a regional arms dynamic where neighbours watch each other’s inventories with growing interest. For Australia, sitting just across the Timor and Arafura Seas, this evolution in its most important neighbour demands careful diplomacy and clear-eyed assessment rather than reflexive alarm or complacency.

Can Indonesia afford both guns and butter? History suggests choices have consequences. In Prabowo’s Indonesia, the menu currently favours missiles. Whether this brings lasting security or simply higher stakes in an already tense region remains the open question

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As tensions in the Persian Gulf spiral following US strikes on Iranian targets, including civilian infrastructure and railway links toward China, Tehran finds itself at a pivotal decision point. Iranian leadership is reportedly convening to weigh responses: proportional retaliation, further escalation, direct strikes on US interests and Israeli assets.

Another option could be a dramatic withdrawal from the IAEA that could pave the way to overturning the long-standing fatwa against nuclear weapons. With the US president’s inflammatory rhetoric labeling Iranian leaders as “scum,” emotion has injected itself into what was already a volatile conflict, raising the stakes for all parties.

Iran has demonstrated restraint in the face of repeated provocations, relying on asymmetric tools rather than full-spectrum confrontation. However, the latest US attacks targeting not just military sites but logistical arteries and civilian areas on the second night of strikes signal a strong willingness in Washington to broaden the conflict.

This comes after Iranian actions in the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint Iran has long viewed as vital to its defensive posture and economic leverage. The waterway’s disruption threatens global energy flows, underscoring Iran’s “other weapons” beyond conventional missiles and drones.

A key option under consideration is withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such a move would send an unambiguous signal to Washington and Tel Aviv. It could formally reverse the fatwa issued by the former supreme leader, opening the door to rapid weaponization.

Iran is widely assessed to possess the technical capability to assemble a nuclear warhead quickly, potentially mating it to existing delivery systems, including advanced missiles acquired or developed through partnerships. This is not mere speculation, as Iran’s sophisticated indigenous programs in rocketry, guidance systems, and related technologies have been battle-tested in recent exchanges.

Iran’s patience is wearing thin under existential pressure. History shows that nations facing unrelenting conventional threats often pivot to deterrence multipliers. North Korea’s trajectory offers a precedent, where possession (or credible demonstration) of nuclear capability fundamentally alters the calculus for aggressors.

Iran, with its vast territory, depth, and alliances, stands in a stronger position than smaller adversaries to absorb and respond to pressure. A nuclear demonstration, as some pundits have suggested perhaps an underground test or explicit acknowledgment, could in theory deter further escalation while exposing the limits of US-Israeli strategy.

Yet escalation carries risks. Direct attacks on US forces or Israeli territory could invite overwhelming response, though Iran’s dispersed assets, underground facilities, and proxy networks complicate any decisive strike.

EMP-capable systems, advanced drones, and the ability to disrupt Gulf infrastructure remain potent non-nuclear options that have not been fully unleashed. Targeting desalination plants, power grids, or AI/data centers in Gulf states could impose severe costs without crossing the nuclear threshold.

Withdrawal from the IAEA and reversal of the nuclear fatwa would mark a strategic inflection. It would humiliate US diplomacy, accelerate a multipolar reconfiguration of global power, and force Israel to confront a fundamentally altered balance.

Iran’s leadership must balance domestic resilience, alliance commitments (notably with partners supplying advanced systems), and the imperative to protect sovereignty.

The current trajectory risks a protracted war of attrition that drains all sides. US strikes on railways hint at efforts to isolate Iran economically, and the attacks on electricity distribution to inconvenience civilians. This risks very damaging retaliation within the gulf area.

Proportional response might preserve moral high ground and international sympathy, but repeated restraint could invite further probing. Direct confrontation tests military limits, while the nuclear path offers ultimate deterrence at the cost of intensified sanctions and isolation rhetoric.

Iran’s choices will shape not only the Gulf but the broader international order. In a region long dominated by external powers, Tehran’s ability to wield ambiguity successfully through conventional, asymmetric, and potentially nuclear, remains its strongest card.

As meetings conclude in Tehran, the world watches whether calculated restraint, surprise capabilities, or a bold breakout defines the next phase. The Pentagon and its allies would do well to remember that Iran has consistently prepared surprises for renewed aggression.

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In the world of international relations and business, Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) are often hailed as flexible tools for cooperation. They allow parties, be they governments or corporations to signal intent, outline frameworks for collaboration, and move forward without the immediate rigidity of formal treaties. Yet their fundamental weakness is glaring, MOUs are not legally binding agreements. They represent goodwill, political expediency, or strategic posturing rather than enforceable commitments.

The recent flare-up in the Gulf starkly illustrates this reality. An MOU, as the saying goes, is not worth the paper it is written on when interests clash and power dynamics shift.

US attacks on Strait of Hormuz coast line part of a strategy?

Just weeks after the United States and Iran signed a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding on June 17, 2026, which was intended to end hostilities, ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and set the stage for broader de-escalation, the agreement has unraveled.

Iran allegedly attacked commercial tankers in the Strait, prompting US retaliatory strikes on targets in southern Iran, including ports and infrastructure. Iran then responded by targeting US military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait. Blasts were reported, oil prices spiked, and global markets trembled. What began as a tentative framework for peace has dissolved into familiar cycles of accusation and retaliation.

At a NATO summit, President Donald Trump was blunt. Asked about the situation, he declared the US-Iran MOU “over.” “I don’t want to deal with them anymore. They’re scum. They’re led by sick people… As far as I’m concerned, it’s over.” His language was characteristically unfiltered, dismissing further engagement.

Iran condemned the US strikes as a “blatant act of aggression,” vowing a “crushing response.” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi pushed back against Trump’s “vulgar” remarks, emphasizing Iranian resolve: “We do not answer vulgarity with vulgarity, but with action.” Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf echoed this, declaring, “The era of bullying and extortion is over.”

This episode reveals deeper truths about MOUs in high-stakes geopolitical contexts.

Unlike treaties ratified by legislatures with clear enforcement mechanisms, MOUs rely on mutual self-interest and the threat of consequences for violation. In Business-Government or Government-Government dealings, they serve as low-commitment starting points, only really useful for testing waters or buying time.

However, when one side perceives advantage or provocation, they evaporate. The Strait of Hormuz, which handles around 20% of global crude oil and natural gas, was a core element of the June MOU. Iran agreed to facilitate safe passage while asserting rights to regulate traffic and potentially collect fees. Interpretations diverged immediately. Ships attempting passage without “authorization” became targets, in Tehran’s view. The US saw this as outright violation.

The US strategy appears aimed at gaining leverage. By striking Iranian targets, Washington seeks to deter interference with shipping and pressure Iran on broader issues, including charges or “services” for vessels transiting the Gulf.

This fits a pattern of using military posture to enforce compliance where diplomatic paper falls short. Yet the risks are immense and multifaceted.

Oil prices surged 5% initially toward USD78 per barrel, with potential to revisit USD120 levels seen in earlier phases of conflict.

A prolonged disruption could trigger broader economic pain. Houthis or Iranian proxies might intensify Red Sea disruptions. Critical oil facilities across Iran and Gulf states could face destruction. Undersea internet cables in the region remain vulnerable. Escalation could draw in other actors, destabilizing energy markets and global supply chains.

The timing of the attacks adds another layer of provocation. They occurred amid sensitive moments for Iranian leadership, potentially agitating hardliners and complicating internal politics.

For Trump, with US midterm elections looming, a firm stance against Iran projects strength to domestic audiences wary of perceived weakness. However, this brinkmanship carries domestic costs if energy prices spike and inflation returns.

Meanwhile, China’s influence as a constraint on Iran through economic ties and diplomatic channels may now be viewed differently in Washington. Beijing has stakes in regional stability for its own energy imports, but shifting alliances could alter the calculus.

Iranian responses draw on narratives of resistance and sovereignty, rooted in decades of perceived external interference. US actions reflect a transactional worldview where deals are tools until they are not. Both sides operate in environments where signaling resolve matters more than legal niceties. MOUs thrive in stable, trust-building phases but crumble under pressure because they lack the teeth of binding arbitration or automatic sanctions regimes.

This Gulf episode is a textbook case study in the limitations of informal agreements. They allow movement where full treaties are politically impossible, yet they foster ambiguity that breeds misunderstanding. Parties can claim adherence while interpreting terms to suit immediate needs. When push comes to shove, raw power through either military, economic, or rhetorical, outcomes are decided through actions, not signatures on paper.

The broader lesson extends beyond US-Iran relations. In an era of multipolar tensions, from trade disputes to regional security pacts, MOUs will proliferate as pragmatic shortcuts. Businesses negotiating with governments, or nations forging temporary alignments, should treat them as what they are: expressions of intent, not guarantees. Due diligence, contingency planning, and clear exit ramps are essential. Verifying interests that align with events time matters more than drafting elegant language.

As markets digest the latest volatility and diplomats scramble, the fragility of the June MOU stands exposed. It was never a robust peace but a pause button. The current strikes and counterstrikes confirm what practitioners have long known in geopolitics, especially in volatile chokepoints like the Gulf. MOUs are sketchy documents at best. They buy time, but rarely buy security. True stability demands deeper alignment or overwhelming deterrence, neither of which paper alone can provide. The Gulf has once again taught this lesson the hard way.

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History has a cruel habit of repeating its tragedies in new technological wrappers. In March 1968, American soldiers entered the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai and slaughtered hundreds of unarmed women, children, infants in a frenzy that later became a symbol of a war gone morally bankrupt. The official story at first was “enemy engagement.” The truth, when it leaked out, shattered illusions about American exceptionalism in warfare.

Fast forward to February 28, 2026. On the very first day of the American-Israeli military campaign against Iran, a US Tomahawk missile slammed into the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School in the coastal city of Minab. More than 120 students, many aged just 6 to 13, and 26 teachers died in the strike. The images of rubble, tiny shoes in the dust, grieving parents are as visceral today as the grainy black-and-white photos from My Lai were then.

A Bloomberg probe, citing sources familiar with the US Central Command investigation, reveals the reason was not fog of war chaos or Iranian deception, but something more systemic and damning. Bureaucratic failure and institutional blindness were the cause.

Years earlier, in 2019, a US intelligence analyst had spotted that a site previously designated as an IRGC naval facility had become an elementary school. He entered the update into a digital intelligence tool. That tool was not linked to the authoritative Pentagon database used for actual strike planning. The warning never reached commanders. The “significant and longstanding gaps” in target analysis allowed the school to remain on the target list as if it were still a military installation.

This was not a rogue platoon high on adrenaline. This was precision-guided policy meeting outdated data in a high-tech system supposedly designed to prevent exactly this kind of horror. The missile flew true. The children did not.

Echoes of My Lai

The parallels to My Lai are uncomfortable but illuminating. In both cases, initial narratives sought to diffuse responsibility. In Vietnam, it was “search and destroy” gone wrong. In Minab, we hear talk of “missiles flying all over the place” from the highest levels, with suggestions that the culprit “may never be established.” President Trump’s recent remarks fit the pattern: deflection through uncertainty. Iran calls it a calculated, phased assault and a crime against humanity. The Pentagon’s investigation, completed months ago, remains unpublished.

My Lai was not just a massacre. It exposed a military culture that had dehumanized the enemy to the point where villages became free-fire zones. Minab exposes a different but related pathology: a remote, algorithmic way of war where human verification has been outsourced to disconnected databases and legacy intelligence labels. Children become collateral not through bloodlust on the ground, but through the quiet violence of unintegrated spreadsheets and unheeded analyst notes.

The body count may differ in intimacy, as boots on the ground versus a cruise missile launched from hundreds of miles away. Nevertheless, the moral weight feels eerily similar. Both incidents involved the killing of innocents in a conflict sold as necessary. Both triggered international outrage and domestic discomfort. Both risk becoming footnotes if accountability is managed carefully enough.

Broader Implications

What makes Minab particularly haunting is its timing and context. It occurred on day one of a new conflict, when scrutiny should have been highest. The school sat adjacent to a legitimate military target, but the wall separating them, built years ago, apparently did not update the digital soul of American targeting doctrine. Multiple databases still fail to speak to one another. This is not an isolated glitch; it is a feature of a system optimized for speed and lethality over caution.

Emily Tripp of Airwars noted the difficulty in attributing the hundreds of civilian harm incidents across Iran. Yet Minab stands out with clear evidence of American munitions, a known site, and now an internal probe confirming the intelligence failure. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was not engaging in mere rhetoric when he demanded accountability. For many in the region and beyond, this is the face of the war: a girls’ school reduced to rubble on opening day.

The My Lai massacre eventually led to courts-martial, though few convictions and helped turn American and global opinion further against the Vietnam War. It became a cultural scar.

Will Minab receive even that level of reckoning? The signs are not promising. Investigations drag on. Political statements blur responsibility. The machinery of modern war of drones, missiles, AI-assisted targeting with even Musk’s Grok reportedly playing a role in volume moves on to the next set of coordinates.

In both cases, the victims were not collateral in the fog of battle so much as they were rendered invisible by the way power processes the world. Vietnamese peasants became “gooks.” Iranian schoolchildren became outdated database entries.

As we reflect on Minab, the question we must ask is not merely “who is to blame,” but what kind of civilization builds systems so sophisticated they can deliver a missile through a classroom window while remaining so bureaucratically primitive that a child’s desk can be mislabeled as an enemy asset for years?

History does not repeat exactly. But its moral lessons do. My Lai taught that dehumanization and cover-up corrode the soul of a nation. Minab whispers the same warning from the rubble of an Iranian schoolyard. Whether we listen this time may determine if future generations remember 2026 as another shameful chapter, or as the moment we finally demanded better.

The children of Minab, like those of My Lai, deserved better than to become symbols. Yet here we are again, with nothing learnt from history and humankind’s moral compass not rising together with our advancements in technology.

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WORLD economies have yet to fully register the economic aftershocks of the latest Gulf conflict.

Global oil inventories, drawn down aggressively during the height of tensions, have acted as a temporary buffer, masking the true severity of disruptions in energy flows from the Middle East.

While headlines suggest de-escalation, the reality on maritime supply chains tells a more precarious story.

Asian economies, heavily dependent on Gulf crude and refined products, now face the prospect of cascading shortages that could tip several regional players toward stagnation or outright recession in the second half of 2026.

The Memorandum of Understanding signed last week has done little to restore confidence.

Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains almost stagnant, despite optimistic declarations from US President Donald Trump that the vital chokepoint is “open.” Insurance premiums for tankers have stayed elevated, and many operators continue to reroute or delay voyages.

This persistent hesitation reflects deep operational caution rather than political rhetoric.

Compounding the uncertainty is the fresh MOU between Israel and Lebanon, which, while presented as a stabilising step, introduces new layers of complexity.

Its downstream effects on alliances, proxy actors, and maritime security will likely become clearer over the coming weeks, keeping risk premiums elevated across energy markets.

On the ground, logistical frictions are already visible.

Shortages of urea, nitrogen-based fertilisers, and associated petrochemicals have emerged as refineries scramble to reconfigure processes for varying grades of crude.

Many facilities optimised for heavier Gulf grades now face mismatches with lighter supplies, forcing costly adjustments and reduced throughput.

Heavy crude shortages are particularly acute for aviation fuel production, placing strain on regional airlines and logistics networks at a time when post-pandemic recovery still feels fragile in parts of Southeast and South Asia.

Incidents continue to underscore the fragility.

Iranian drone attacks on vessels attempting the Strait crossing, met with US missile reprisals targeting Iranian coastal positions, illustrate how quickly calm can unravel.

Sources in Tehran describe daily life gradually returning to a semblance of normalcy, yet laced with apprehension of further strikes.

The Iranian military remains on high alert, projecting readiness that deters rapid normalisation.

Meanwhile, US forces are being recalled, a move that carries domestic political costs for President Trump as mid-term elections loom.

The persistent wild card remains Israel, whose strategic intentions are opaque, sustaining elevated tensions that prevent markets from fully pricing in recovery.

For Asia, the pain is no longer theoretical. Oil and fuel shortages are projected to materialise from next month onward, driven by extended supply chain lead times.

Even if hostilities ceased immediately, the lag in tanker scheduling, refinery reprogramming, and inventory replenishment ensures disruptions will bite.

Manufacturing hubs in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and India are already adjusting to softening global demand, which will confront higher input costs and potential energy rationing.

Local supply chains, power generation, particularly in countries reliant on oil-fired plants, and public transport systems face direct hits.

Governments will soon be forced into difficult trade-offs: subsidy expansions versus fiscal restraint, strategic reserve releases versus preserving buffers, and industrial prioritisation that may leave smaller enterprises exposed.

These pressures are expected to dampen GDP growth across much of Asia in the latter half of the year.

Early estimates suggest downward revisions of 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points in several economies, with ripple effects reaching households through higher transport fares, elevated food prices (exacerbated by fertiliser constraints), and softer employment in export-oriented sectors.

The community-level impacts will include reduced consumer spending, postponed investments, and potential social strains, which will unfold progressively over the coming months.

Asian policymakers must now brace for a volatile period where Gulf stability, or its absence, dictates regional fortunes more than domestic reforms.

Diversification efforts, long discussed, suddenly appear urgent.

Yet in the short term, the region remains tethered to events far beyond its shores. The coming quarter will test not only supply chain resilience but the agility of governments to manage the human and economic consequences of energy insecurity.

The Gulf conflict may be winding down on the battlefield, but its economic warheads are only beginning to land in Asian capitals. – June 28, 2026

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Under the former secretary-general of ASEAN Dr Surin Pitsuwan, the grouping developed a strategic geopolitical outlook. However, after his demise, ASEAN has tended to drift aimlessly and lose its original visons.

Dr Surin Pitsuwan forever in the heart of ASEAN

In the era of U.S.-led unipolarity, institutions like the G7 and G20 often reflected Western priorities, sometimes sidelining the developmental aspirations of the Global South. Today, amid the rise of multipolarity, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is carving out a more prominent role. This is not as a confrontational bloc, but as a pragmatic hub for trade, investment, and balanced cooperation. Recent developments, particularly the Russia-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in Kazan, underscore this shift.

The summit, marking 35 years of ASEAN-Russia dialogue relations, went beyond commemoration. Co-chaired by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Russian President Vladimir Putin, it produced concrete outcomes: the Kazan Declaration 2026, the Comprehensive Plan of Action for the ASEAN-Russia Strategic Partnership (2026-2030), a Joint Statement on Energy Cooperation, and one on Cultural Cooperation. These documents map out deeper ties in energy, nuclear technology, connectivity, security, and digital development—areas vital for ASEAN’s growth.

Russian experts highlight ASEAN’s appeal. Farhad Ibragimov, a Middle East expert at Russia’s Financial University, argues that ASEAN is emerging as “a new, alternative center of global power.” With its massive economic footprint, logistics networks, and trade volumes, the bloc demonstrates “the logic of development” focused on trade, investment, and regional cooperation, contrasting with the G7’s increasingly “obsolete and ideologically-driven” approach. He positions ASEAN alongside BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as pillars of multipolarity, where pragmatism trumps rigid alliances.

For Russia, ASEAN represents a viable alternative to the EU for investment and trade partnerships. Moscow and ASEAN nations share a preference for sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and non-interference. As Ibragimov notes, this cooperation exposes the absence of a true global anti-Russian consensus, countering Western narratives of isolation. The summit reinforced mutual respect for international law, ASEAN centrality, and a just multipolar order.

Energy and Nuclear Cooperation as Cornerstones

Energy security dominated discussions. Southeast Asia’s rapid growth drives surging demand, making reliable supplies critical. Russia, a major energy player, is well-placed to partner in natural gas, LNG, renewables, and nuclear power. Countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia are advancing LNG ties, while Vietnam’s long-standing Vietsovpetro joint venture provides a strong foundation.

Nuclear cooperation stands out as a flagship initiative. Rosatom’s agreement with Vietnam on the Ninh Thuan-1 project signals ASEAN interest in nuclear energy for decarbonization and technological sovereignty. Mastery of advanced energy systems enhances industrial competitiveness and resilience are goals aligned with ASEAN’s development priorities.

Security, Economy, and Connectivity

Beyond energy, the partnership bolsters a balanced security architecture. Through ASEAN-led mechanisms like the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, both sides address maritime security, counterterrorism, cyber threats, and transnational crime without zero-sum blocs. Russia’s engagement helps prevent excessive concentration of power in the Asia-Pacific.

Economically, the 2026-2030 Plan prioritizes transport corridors, logistics, digital platforms, and financial mechanisms linking Southeast Asia with Eurasia. Diversifying away from over-reliance on the U.S. dollar enhances sovereignty; Russia has already shifted much of its trade to national and BRICS currencies. Engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and SCO further builds resilient networks.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s leadership as ASEAN Chair last year helped steer this trajectory. Anwar has championed ASEAN centrality, neutrality, and engagement with all major powers, emphasizing unity and pragmatism in a multipolar landscape. His approach in prioritizing economic ties, AI, energy, and strategic autonomy strongly resonates across the region.

Even leaders with strong U.S. ties, like Marcos Jr., actively participated, illustrating ASEAN’s rejection of binary choices. Southeast Asian states pursue diversified partnerships based on national interests, not ideology.

Implications for a Multipolar Future

The Kazan summit illustrated a broader reality. Multipolarity thrives on networks of sovereign states seeking mutual benefit. ASEAN’s economic dynamism, demographic dividend, and strategic location position it ideally to bridge Asia-Pacific and Eurasian spaces.

In the unipolar era, ASEAN sometimes navigated Western-dominated forums cautiously. Today, it leverages multiple poles, with China, the U.S., Russia, India, Japan, gaining maximum leverage and autonomy.

Challenges remain, including internal cohesion and external pressures. Yet the logic of development that ASEAN embodies pragmatic, inclusive, growth-oriented goals offers a compelling model. As Ibragimov suggests, it eclipses outdated Western-centric formats in relevance for the Global South.

ASEAN’s new lease of life is not about replacing old powers but thriving in a world of options. By deepening ties with Russia and other non-traditional partners while upholding centrality, the bloc is better equipped to deliver prosperity and stability. In the emerging multipolar order, ASEAN is not a follower. ASEAN is now an indispensable player shaping its own destiny.

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In a development that has raised eyebrows across Southeast Asia, reports indicate that Indonesia is preparing to deploy advanced Indian-made BrahMos supersonic missiles along its side of the Strait of Malacca. According to a June 8, 2026, report by MalaysiaNow, citing anonymous Jakarta sources, the plan was discussed during a high-level inter-agency meeting on May 20. The move aligns with broader efforts by President Prabowo Subianto’s administration to bolster Indonesia’s maritime defense capabilities in one of the world’s most critical chokepoints.

The BrahMos, a joint India-Russia supersonic cruise missile system, is renowned for its speed of up to Mach 3, a range of approximately 300 km, and its ability to carry significant payloads. If deployed at strategic points along the Sumatran coastline facing the Strait, these missiles could provide Indonesia with potent anti-ship and land-attack capabilities, enabling rapid response to potential threats in the narrow waterway. The timing coincides with anticipated formalization during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Indonesia in July 2026. Indonesia would join the Philippines and Vietnam as Southeast Asian operators of the system.

This latest development is part of a larger pattern of Indonesian military modernization over the past several years. Under successive administrations, and accelerating under Prabowo, Jakarta has pursued an ambitious procurement drive to upgrade its armed forces (TNI). Indonesia has acquired advanced fighter jets from multiple suppliers, including French Rafales, American F-15EX variants, Turkish KAAN fighters, and ongoing involvement in the South Korean KF-21 program. Naval capabilities have also expanded with new frigates from the UK (Arrowhead 140 design), Italy, and Turkey, alongside submarines and other assets. Defense budgets have seen nominal increases, with plans discussed to raise spending toward 1.5% of GDP, reflecting a push for greater self-reliance and deterrence amid regional tensions.

Additional procurements include Turkish KHAN ballistic missiles, making Indonesia the first in Southeast Asia with such systems, and interest in various drones and maritime technologies. This “retail approach” to acquisitions—from diverse suppliers like France, the US, Turkey, India, and others—aims to fill capability gaps quickly but has drawn criticism for potential logistical and interoperability challenges. Nevertheless, it signals Jakarta’s determination to transform its military from a primarily defensive force into one with greater power projection, particularly in its vast archipelagic waters.

The Strait of Malacca, a 900-km waterway separating Sumatra from Peninsular Malaysia, is a vital artery for global trade. It carries a massive portion of East Asia’s energy imports and commercial shipping between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Indonesia’s push to assert greater influence here draws parallels to Iran’s role in the Strait of Hormuz. In April 2026, Prabowo reportedly emphasized Indonesia’s strategic position, noting that significant shares of regional trade and energy pass through its waters. Subsequent comments by officials about potential levies on shipping, though later walked back, unsettled neighbors like Malaysia and Singapore, who have long cooperated with Indonesia on joint patrols against piracy and other threats.

Some analysts suggest that deploying BrahMos missiles would markedly shift the balance of power in the Strait toward Indonesia. Currently, the waterway operates under principles of international navigation with collaborative security arrangements among littoral states. Supersonic missiles on the southern shore could introduce new deterrence dynamics, allowing Indonesia to monitor and potentially influence passage more assertively. This might enhance Jakarta’s leverage in maritime governance and economic negotiations but could also heighten tensions, complicate freedom of navigation, and prompt responses from Malaysia, Singapore, or external powers like the US and China, who have interests in secure sea lanes.

The US-Indonesia Major Defense Cooperation Partnership, signed in April 2026, adds another layer. It expands potential US access to Indonesian airspace and capabilities, possibly for surveillance over the Strait, even as Indonesia diversifies partners including India.

Critics warn that militarizing the Strait risks disrupting cooperative mechanisms, increasing uncertainties for energy supplies and global trade, and sparking an arms race dynamic in Southeast Asia. Proponents in Jakarta view it as necessary modernization in an era of great-power competition, where control over chokepoints translates into strategic relevance.

Kalimantan Military Build-up

Indonesia’s military build-up is not just restricted to the Strait of Melaka. Indonesia has also been strengthening its military footprint in Kalimantan, the Indonesian portion of Borneo that shares a long land border with Malaysia’s states of Sabah and Sarawak.

In recent years, Jakarta has expanded army border posts, increased troop presence, and modernized capabilities in the region, including the reported stationing of Turkish-made KHAN ballistic missiles in East Kalimantan near disputed maritime areas like Ambalat. The relocation of Indonesia’s new capital to Nusantara in East Kalimantan is further driving infrastructure development that supports greater logistical and military sustainment across the island.

Combined with the planned deployment of advanced supersonic missiles along its Sumatran coastline facing the Strait of Malacca, these developments position Indonesia with significant strategic leverage on both the western maritime approaches and the eastern land border of Peninsular and East Malaysia. Analysts note that this dual posture effectively creates a pincer-like strategic encirclement around Malaysia, enhancing Indonesia’s ability to project power and influence in key chokepoints and border areas, potentially altering longstanding regional power balances in Southeast Asia.

As the region watches developments ahead of Modi’s visit, Indonesia’s actions underscore its evolving role as a more assertive maritime player. While enhancing its own security, the missile deployments could reshape longstanding assumptions about stability in the Malacca Strait, with implications extending far beyond Southeast Asia. The coming months will reveal whether this contributes to a more secure or a more contested maritime domain.

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In the wake of Iran’s recent missile barrages and the intense exchanges of 2025–2026, a striking development has emerged: the United States appeared to step back from fully committing to Israel’s defense in ways that once defined their alliance. While Washington has provided intelligence, defensive support, and conducted its own strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, reports and statements suggested limits on direct involvement during certain phases of Iranian retaliation. This perceived distancing amid other domestic U.S. priorities and war fatigue with the mid-term elections coming up has left Israel more exposed than in previous confrontations.

This moment arrives as global public opinion has soured dramatically on Israel’s military campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, and against so-called Iranian proxies. Polls across many countries show unfavorable views of Israel reaching historic highs. Protests, boycotts, and diplomatic isolation have intensified. Even within Israel, Netanyahu faces deep polarization, with approval ratings hovering around 40% and significant segments of the public questioning prolonged conflicts.

These pressures in a nation with competing narratives raise a pivotal question: Could the Iran war mark the beginning of the end for the so-called “Greater Israel Project”?

What Is “Greater Israel”?

The concept of Eretz Yisrael HaShlema (“the Whole Land of Israel”) has biblical, historical, and political layers. It is not a single, universally agreed-upon policy but a spectrum of aspirations often invoked by religious Zionists, revisionist thinkers, and right-wing politicians.

Biblically, it draws from passages like Genesis 15:18–21, describing a covenant with Abraham promising land “from the river of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates.” Interpretations vary: some see it as a maximalist vision encompassing parts or all of modern Egypt ( the Nile to Brook of Egypt/Sinai), Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and into Iraq. Others limit it to the area “between the Sea and the Jordan River” as essentially Israel proper plus the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), Gaza, and sometimes the Golan Heights.

From Israel’s Formation:

Pre-1948 Zionism: Theodor Herzl, founder of modern Zionism, focused primarily on establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine amid European antisemitism. Some early discussions referenced broader areas “from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates” in brainstorming sessions, but these were not core platforms. Revisionists like Ze’ev Jabotinsky advocated for a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan, influencing groups like Betar. The 1919 Paris Peace Conference saw Zionist proposals for expanded borders, but the 1922 Mandate for Palestine already separated Transjordan.

1948 War and Statehood: Israel declared independence within UN-partitioned borders. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War expanded its control. Armistice lines (Green Line) left the West Bank under Jordanian control and Gaza under Egypt.

1967 Six-Day War: A turning point. Israel captured the Sinai, Gaza, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights. This fueled the modern Greater Israel movement (Movement for Greater Israel), which opposed territorial concessions and promoted settlement. Sinai was returned to Egypt in 1982 for peace. Israel withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in 2005.

Post-1967 to Today: Likud platforms emphasized sovereignty “between the Sea and the Jordan.” Settlement expansion in the West Bank has been a priority for right-wing governments. Netanyahu has referenced connections to broader visions, drawing condemnation.

The most expansive “Nile to Euphrates” map is often cited in criticism as evidence of expansionism, though many analysts call it a conspiracy theory or fringe interpretation rather than official policy. Israel has no formal annexation plans beyond the West Bank debate.

A Clarifying Map: The classic visual shows a shaded region covering Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Lebanon, much of Syria, parts of Egypt’s Sinai and beyond, and western Iraq. This is vastly larger than current Israel, about 20,770 km² vs. millions in the maximalist view. In practice, Israeli policy has focused on security buffers, settlements, and control of key areas rather than outright conquest of distant capitals.

Isolation, Failed Accords, and Internal Rejection

The Abraham Accords of 2020 under the previous Trump administration contained normalization deals with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. To many Zionists, this symbolized a new era of pragmatic Arab-Israeli ties bypassing the Palestinian issue. Economic and security cooperation grew. However, the Gaza war and subsequent conflicts have chilled momentum. Public opinion in Arab states turned sharply negative; new deals stalled, notably with Saudi Arabia. While formal ties have not fully collapsed, practical engagement has cooled significantly.

A prolonged or costly war with Iran risks further erosion. Arab states prioritizing stability may view an emboldened, expansionist Israel as a greater threat than Iran’s weakened position. Israel could face a future as a smaller, more isolated state, which may remain militarily strong but diplomatically constrained, economically strained by boycotts and regional hostility.

Inside Israel, divisions are stark. While annexation sentiment exists on the right, especially for the West Bank. Broader public support for endless conflict or maximalist goals is limited. Many Israelis prioritize security, economy, and normalcy over ideological expansion. Netanyahu’s coalition has relied on far-right partners, but polls show fatigue, polarization, and questions about leadership.

Israel as a Path to Prosperity Without Expansion

Critics argue Israel has been the primary obstacle to regional peace through settlement expansion, occupation policies, and rejection of comprehensive deals addressing Palestinian statehood. Supporters counter that Palestinian rejectionism, terrorism (Hamas, Hezbollah), and Iranian-backed rejection of Israel’s existence are the real barriers. Wars in 1948, 1967, 1973, intifadas, and ongoing rocket attacks shaped a security-first doctrine.

The thesis here is that clinging to Greater Israel designs perpetuates a cycle: perpetual conflict, isolation, and opportunity costs. An Israel that formally or de facto abandons maximalist territorial ambitions, focusing on defensible borders, technological/economic strength, and genuine two-state or confederation compromises could thrive. Normalized relations with a broader Arab world including Saudi Arabia, and the broader Sunni states could unlock trade, tourism, and security pacts against shared threats. A smaller, secure, prosperous Israel integrated regionally would likely enjoy greater long-term viability than one pursuing biblical maximalism amid demographic, diplomatic, and military strain.

The Iran conflicts of 2025–2026 may accelerate this reckoning. With U.S. support not unlimited, global opinion adverse, Arab normalization stalled, and internal Israeli debates intensifying, the vision of Greater Israel faces formidable headwinds. Whether it fails outright depends on Israeli choices, either to double down amid isolation, or pivot toward pragmatic security and integration.

A post-expansionist Israel need not be diminished. It could model success as a high-tech, culturally vibrant nation at peace with neighbors, proving that true strength lies in prosperity and acceptance rather than contested land. The coming years will test which path prevails.

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In the opaque theater of Northeast Asian power politics, symbolism often outweighs substance. The Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision to travel to Pyongyang for a two-day state visit, his first in nearly seven years represents more than a routine diplomatic exchange between “lips and teeth” allies. It is a carefully staged reaffirmation of a relationship strained by sanctions, pandemic isolation, and Pyongyang’s opportunistic pivot toward Moscow.

One must peel back the ceremonial layers to see the deeper strategic undercurrents: dependency, leverage, and the quiet recalibration of influence in a multipolar world where old alliances are being tested by new realities.

Echoes of 2019 turning into the realities of 2026

Xi Jinping last visited Pyongyang in 2019, while Kim was in Beijing last September, joining Russian President Vladimir Putin at a military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of Imperial Japan’s defeat in World War II. The trip comes weeks after Xi hosted Putin and US President Donald Trump in Beijing in separate high-level meetings.

The timing is telling. Back in 2019, Kim was under intense pressure from maximum-pressure sanctions and collapsing denuclearization talks. China played the role of indispensable patron, offering economic lifelines while urging restraint. Today, the dynamics have inverted in subtle but significant ways. North Korea has weathered isolation through sanctions evasion, deepened military-technical cooperation with Russia which includes troop deployments and arms exports that have reportedly boosted its economy, and enhanced its nuclear and missile programs with defiance. Kim arrives at this summit emboldened, not desperate.

Xi Jinping has just played host to both Putin (May 19-20) and Trump (May 14-15). The contrast in those Beijing summits was stark. With Putin, there were over 40 cooperation agreements spanning trade, technology, and media, talk of ties at “the highest level in history,” and an extension of the 2001 friendship treaty. With Trump, the optics were grand but the deliverables more transactional and understated. They included Boeing aircraft purchases, verbal pledges on soybeans, and relatively muted state media fanfare. These meetings underscored China’s dual-track diplomacy—deepening strategic alignment with Russia while managing a volatile but economically vital relationship with the United States.

Now Xi Jinping is in Pyongyang. This is not just neighborhood maintenance; it is Beijing signaling that it will not cede ground in its traditional sphere, even as North Korea tests the limits of that patronage.

The Enduring “Blood Alliance” and Its Limits

China and North Korea have maintained close party and state ties since the Korean War. Beijing remains Pyongyang’s main economic partner and has repeatedly called for dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, while opposing unilateral sanctions and military pressure.

This relationship is foundational yet asymmetrical and often frustrating for Beijing. China provides the economic oxygen with trade, fuel, and diplomatic cover, that keeps the DPRK afloat. In return, Pyongyang offers a strategic buffer against US-aligned forces in South Korea and Japan, and a persistent thorn in Washington’s side that diverts American attention and resources.

Yet Kim’s regime has never been a pliable client. Its survivalist paranoia, nuclear ambitions, and willingness to play Russia and China off each other have long complicated Beijing’s preference for stability on the peninsula.

Xi Jinping’s visit occurs against a backdrop of North Korean economic stirrings fueled partly by Russian dealings and continued missile advancements. Beijing likely seeks to reassert some measure of influence, perhaps moderating provocations, encouraging dialogue channels, or securing assurances on border stability and refugee flows, while projecting unbreakable socialist solidarity. For Kim, the summit offers legitimacy, potential economic sweeteners, and a hedge against over-reliance on Moscow.

Broader Geopolitical Ripples

This visit cannot be separated from the wider regional mosaic.

The China-Russia-North Korea axis, while not a formal bloc, creates a de facto alignment that complicates US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Extended friendship treaties, joint military parades, and economic interdependencies form a counterweight to alliances like the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral. Yet beneath the pageantry, fractures exist.

North Korea’s growing autonomy challenges China’s traditional dominance. Economic dependence on Beijing persists, but diversified partnerships reduce leverage. Xi must navigate this without pushing Pyongyang further into Moscow’s embrace or triggering destabilizing escalations.

However, in the grand scheme, Xi Jinping’s Pyongyang journey is classic great-power diplomacy: part nostalgia for revolutionary brotherhood, part pragmatic power balancing, and part theater for domestic and international audiences. It underscores a core truth in regional geopolitics, ideological affinity and historical memory provide the glue, but raw interests and shifting capabilities dictate the dance.

Expect warm embraces at Kim Il Sung Square, toasts to eternal friendship, and vague joint statements on peace and cooperation. The real test will come in follow-through: whether this resets the patron-client equilibrium or merely papers over diverging trajectories in an era of great-power competition.

Northeast Asia remains a powder keg where symbolism buys time, but underlying tectonic shifts, nuclear proliferation, alliance realignments, and economic survivability will shape the next chapter. Xi Jinping’s visit is a pause for recalibration, not a resolution. The peninsula’s volatility endures.

It is a move US President Trump has no answer to.

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Deputy Prime Minister Sun Chanthol shakes hand with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Hunt VanderToll. Photo: Chanthol Sun DPM/Facebook

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In a notable diplomatic breakthrough announced on June 5, 2026, Cambodia and the United States concluded an Open Skies Agreement after more than 12 years of negotiations. The understanding paves the way for expanded direct commercial flights, boosted tourism, trade, and investment ties between the two nations. While framed primarily as an economic and civil aviation accord, the timing and context carry significant geopolitical weight in the Indo-Pacific, particularly amid ongoing tensions in the South China Sea.

This agreement is in direct contrast to when former US President Obama visited Cambodia during November 2012 during a wider Asian trip to attend the East Asian Summit and US-ASEAN Leader meeting. During that visit Obama received a very cool reception when he arrived in Phnom Penh International Airport with former Cambodia prime minister Hun Sen not at the airport to greet him. Media reports at the time noted limited public displays of welcome along routes in Phnom Penh. A welcome sign at the airport or in the city greeted Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who was also attending the summit, rather than Obama.

For Washington, the agreement represents a modest but symbolic win in a country long viewed as firmly within China’s orbit. Enhanced air connectivity could strengthen people-to-people links, facilitate American business presence, and serve as a platform for broader engagement. Cambodian officials, meanwhile, highlight the expected boost to tourism and economic diversification, reducing over-reliance on any single partner.

The development gains sharper relevance against the backdrop of Cambodia’s controversial Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand coast. For years, reports have detailed Chinese funding and upgrades at Ream, with allegations of exclusive or preferential access for the People’s Liberation Army Navy, although these claims Phnom Penh has consistently denied, citing its constitutional ban on foreign military bases. The presence of Chinese-built infrastructure and occasional naval visits has raised concerns in Washington and among regional neighbors about potential power projection into the South China Sea.

In this light, Cambodia’s willingness to deepen aviation and economic ties with the US appears surprising. It suggests pragmatic hedging: maintaining strong economic relations with Beijing while opening doors to American investment and connectivity. Recent US-Cambodia reciprocal trade progress and infrastructure overtures, including potential airport investments, further illustrate this balancing act.

Broader regional currents amplify the significance. For decades, ASEAN nations largely maintained an “even keel” between the US and China, prioritizing economic opportunities with Beijing while relying on Washington for security. Recent trends indicate a subtle tilt toward the United States in several capitals, driven by concerns over Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, supply chain resilience, and tariff dynamics. Surveys show varying preferences, with even Cambodia registering notable pro-US sentiment among elites in some polls.

In terms of primacy balance in the South China Sea, the Open Skies deal itself offers limited direct military impact unlike the freedom of navigation operations or basing rights. However, it contributes to a web of US engagement that complicates China’s regional dominance. Greater US commercial presence in Cambodia could indirectly enhance situational awareness, logistics options, and diplomatic leverage. It signals to other ASEAN states that alignment need not be zero-sum, potentially encouraging similar diversification.

Critics may view this as cosmetic, given Ream’s trajectory and Cambodia’s historical closeness to China. Yet in the fluid geopolitics of Southeast Asia, such incremental steps matter. They erode the perception of monolithic blocs and introduce friction into great-power competition. For Cambodia, the deal reflects sophisticated diplomacy, securing gains from both sides without fully alienating either. The agreement can also be seen as a ‘buffer’ against the Thais in the continuing conflict along their mutual border.

Some see the agreement as giving some buffer against the Thais along the disputed mutual border region.

For the US, it underscores the value of persistent, patient engagement in a contested theater. As aviation links grow, so too may the avenues for influence in a region pivotal to global trade and security.

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THE ongoing war between Iran, Israel and the United States is wearing patience thin in Tehran.

The current state of a cease-fire, where ‘tit for tat’ reprisals are a continual threat to the security of Iran, is draining, with Iran continually living under the threat of attack.

Information has surfaced from an alleged telephone conversation between the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshklan and the prime minister of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif, around May 28 that Iran was proposing a demonstration in the Iranian desert of the country’s nuclear capability with a non-combative explosive demonstration.

There are different versions as to how the United States became aware.

Some are saying that US intelligence intercepted the call, while others are saying that Secretary of State Marco Rubio was informed by the Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, on May 29.

This information contradicts the Iranian policy of no nuclear weapons, originating from a Fatwa proclaimed by the former supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenai many years ago.

There is no formal indication that this Fatwa, made in the mid-1990s, has been changed by the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. However, the conditions since the mid-1990s have drastically changed, where Iran is now under existential threat by Israel and the United States.

Contemporary history has shown that nations like North Korea have been treated very differently from countries like Libya and Iraq that didn’t have nuclear weapons by the United States.

Consequently, it may be logical thinking that Iran possessing nuclear weapons would result in a different approach by attackers.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been constantly saying that Iran is on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons.

However, Western intelligence has generally believed that Iran doesn’t possess nuclear weapons.

Iran is a technologically sophisticated country, as the current war has demonstrated.

It is very conceivable that, although a Fatwa forbade Iran from possessing nuclear weapons, the armed forces had processed enough uranium for 9 or 10 warheads, while the actual bombs without the enriched uranium components were stored deep in underground bunkers in another part of the country.

Some nuclear experts believe this is very plausible, although there is no public evidence of this.

Iran definitely has the knowledge, scientific aptitude and ability to do this.

In addition, it’s believed that Iran has long been working together with both Pakistan and North Korea on nuclear weapon technology.

The other possibility is that Iran has obtained several nuclear warheads from either North Korea or Pakistan.

It is known if Pakistan may have already transferred some nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia under Pakistani control.

Image from https://www.38north.org/2023

It should be noted that Iran has already received the Hwasong-18 ICBM intercontinental missiles from North Korea capable of reaching the United States.

Together, these ICBMs with nuclear warheads could be devastating to the United States.

Iran has already proved it has hit Israel with missiles without much resistance today.

What would be very concerning to Israel is that a nuclear strike on Iran would not be as devastating as an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel, because Iran is a very large country, and Israel has a very small land mass.

This means that Iran could annihilate Israel with nuclear weapons without being annihilated itself.

Strategically, this means that the United States and Israel cannot ‘bully’ Iran and expect to escape severe consequences.

The US objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has already failed, with US President Donald Trump being humiliated.

It’s now very unlikely that Iran will continue any more negotiations with the United States, and Israel will be forced to withdraw from Lebanon as well.

If US provocations don’t cease, then it is most likely that Iran would detonate a nuclear device to prove its possession.

If Iran proceeds, then it will be understood that Iran has more than just a single nuclear bomb at its disposal.

This may help Iran finish the war that continues to linger in a ‘cease-fire’ limbo.

Iran proving it possesses a nuclear weapon capability will gravely dent the pride of the United States and lead the world more quickly into a multi-polar order. – June 4, 2026

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